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ABSTRACT 
Authentication is a fundamental aspect of information security in enabling 
the authenticity of the source of information to be determined.  Among several 
electronic authentication mechanisms available today, deploying the right 
authentication mechanism will protect information against its envisaged threat(s) 
in the designated operating environment.  This study attempts to create a 
taxonomy (classification) for current operational authentication protocols, and 
show how the taxonomy could help to determine the appropriate protocol to meet 
a particular operating environment’s authentication needs.  The approach used in 
this study’s taxonomy development was to perform functional decomposition of 
the protocol in terms of the functionality it provides, the mechanisms it utilizes, 
and the key elements in facilitating its operation.  This enabled a breaking-down 
into the fundamental building blocks of what makes up the protocol.  The 
development of the taxonomy in this way enabled different perspectives and 
analyses of the protocols’ capabilities and their applicability. 
The basic idea of authentication via proof of possession of a secret, 
whether it is symmetric or asymmetric, applies for all categories of authentication 
protocols under study.  Several use cases are put forth illustrating how the 
classification can be leveraged to facilitate analysis of the applicability of the 
protocol for implementation in a given targeted environment. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Authentication is a fundamental aspect of information security.  In the 
current Information Age, it is crucial to be able to ascertain the authenticity of the 
source of information; that the originator of a unit of information is indeed as 
claimed. There are several electronic authentication mechanisms available today 
to protect information and provide identity management.  Deploying the right 
authentication mechanism will target protection of information against its 
envisaged threat in the designated operating environment.  Each authentication 
mechanism has its own strengths and weaknesses in terms of number of keys 
required to generate, cost, complexity, key distribution, security services 
provided, and vulnerabilities to certain threats such as spoofing and replay 
attack.  There will be potential impacts in selecting one authentication 
mechanism over another for implementation in a particular domain.  The security 
assurance level will also differ based on the selected authentication factor and 
underlying protocol mechanism. 
An authentication protocol entails a sequence of messages exchanged 
between two parties, which allows the use/possession of some secret to be 
confirmed.  It is almost certain that any authentication protocol will be dependent 
on parameters such as names and identities of authenticating parties, and any 
secrets shared between them. There are several authentication protocols and 
mechanisms available today.  Each of these authentication protocols has some 
common mechanisms of performing authentication, though the implementation 
may differ in terms of strength and processes involved.  The basic idea of 
authentication via proof of possession of secrets applies and remains the same 
for all categories of authentication protocols. 
The authentication protocol key players examined here are an attempt to 
sample the various categories of authentication protocols available.  These key 
players span from standard protocols for applications and network access, to 
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specific operating system protocols, to proprietary protocols.  The focus will be 
on the underlying authentication mechanism, and the analysis will assume that 
the authenticating parties have already established all required prior 
configuration, certificate issuances, shared secret key agreement or key 
distribution requirements. 
In the process of conducting the study of the various e-authentication 
protocols and developing the protocol taxonomy, the primary focus was on 
examining the mechanisms and key elements facilitating the authentication 
process.  There may be differences in how each protocol is implemented; 
however, after peeling the outer layers and inspecting the underlying mechanism, 
it was determined that the fundamental mechanisms governing the way in which 
secrets are exchanged in an authentication session were common to all 
protocols.  Proof of possession of a secret is conducted via asymmetric or 
symmetric means.  Shared symmetric secret is the more commonly used means 
due to its efficiency, relative simplicity, and lower implementation cost. However, 
an asymmetric secret is necessary when non-repudiation is a required security 
service, and to support large-scale enterprises that are not conducive to 
dynamically establishing symmetric keys.  
The basis of building the taxonomy is dependent on the application of the 
taxonomy.  The approach used in this study’s taxonomy development was to 
perform functional decomposition of the protocol in terms of the functionality it 
provides, the mechanisms it utilizes, and the key elements in facilitating the 
operation of protocol function.  This enabled a breaking-down into the 
fundamental building blocks of what constitutes the fundamental authentication 
part of the protocol.  The development of the taxonomy in this way enabled 
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Authentication is a fundamental aspect of information security.  In the 
current information age, the reliability and integrity of data is of great concern for 
organizations and individuals. It is crucial to be able to ascertain the authenticity 
of the source of information; i.e., that the originator of a unit of information is 
indeed as claimed. There are several electronic authentication mechanisms 
available today to protect information and provide identity management. 
Deploying the right authentication mechanism will protect information against its 
envisaged threat in the designated operating environment.  This is especially 
challenging in the inter-networked, widely distributed, and open computing 
environment, which may involve remote authentication over the network, and 
with activities spanning from day-to-day email, business transactions over the 
web, to mobile wireless information exchanges. 
Information security typically consists of the CIA (confidentiality integrity 
availability) triad. The confidentiality element is the protection of information to 
prevent unauthorized disclosure.  The integrity element is the protection of 
information from unauthorized modification and ensuring data authenticity.  It is 
the “I” element in the triad that is the focus of this study, and plays a significant 
role in establishing user identity and data integrity.  Finally, the availability 
element refers to the information and service as being accessible to the user in a 
timely manner. 
When referring to the “integrity” of information protection, it usually 
requires AAA (Authentication, Authorization and Accounting) support to work 
together to manage and control access to the protected information.  
Authentication refers to the identification process and serves to provide 
verification of the user’s identity.  Authorization supports access control to ensure 
that the user is able to access only what he is "allowed" to.  Accounting serves to 
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log user actions, information access, and information modification in support of 
audit security controls.  These three processes are required to work together to 
ensure that the protection of information is complete, and ensure that the right 
user is allowed access to the information and that information modification is 
documented. 
This thesis will focus on the authentication protocol in identity verification 
and protecting information integrity.  For identity verification, this means the user 
needs to prove who he claims to be. The user may provide one or more pieces of 
evidence to prove his identity.  The evidence may be in the form of a secret 
password shared between the user and the system, presentation of a valid 
identification card issued by a recognized authority, or some physiological 
characteristic based biometric that is bound to the user.  Different authentication 
mechanisms can influence the assurance level of the protection of information.  
The authentication protocol is the implementation that leverages the 
authentication mechanism to facilitate secure data exchanges between 
communicating endpoints.  As authentication may take place locally and remotely 
over the network, it is critical to consider the operating environment and network 
limitations to deploy the appropriate authentication protocol. 
B. WHAT IS E-AUTHENTICATION? 
The definition of authentication is “the process of determining whether 
someone or something is, in fact, who or what it is declared to be” 
(SearchSecurity.com, 2007).  Users who are required to be authenticated will 
have to prove their claimed identities.  
E-authentication involves mechanisms to verify and ensure that only 
authorized users can log on to a particular domain and access data or network 
resources in an electronic manner.  As such, users will be required to present 
their identity tokens electronically for validation.  In some cases, electronic 
credentials are used during authentication.  An electronic credential refers to a 
digital document or object that binds the user identity to the token possessed and 
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represents the user in gaining access to the information system locally as well as 
remotely.  The fundamental components of an e-authentication infrastructure 
include registration, tokens, token management, authentication process and 
assertions (NIST,1 2008).  The focus of this thesis is on the creation of a 
taxonomy of the authentication process and protocol. 
1. Registration 
Registration is the first step in e-authentication in which the user 
subscribes to some Registration Authority and is issued a secret token and a 
credential that binds to the user name by a Credential Service Provider (CSP).  
The token and credential may be used for subsequent authentication activities.  













Figure 1.   Registration Process (After NIST, 2008) 
 
                                            
1 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the federal technology agency that 
develops and promotes measurements, standards and technology. http://www.nist.gov/index.html   
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2. Tokens 
A token is what the user possesses to authenticate his identity.  In 
general, each token may contain a secret or something that binds solely to the 
particular user.  The three token types often considered are as follows:  
a) What you know (e.g., password, private information of the user) 
b) What you have (e.g., driver’s license, ID smart card, cryptographic 
key, one-time password device) 
c) What you are (biometric data such as fingerprints, hand writing 
metrics, facial features, or iris patterns) 
A single token or a combination of two or more tokens (multi factor) may 
be used for authentication.  The use of multi factor tokens typically enhances the 
assurance level of the overall authentication system. 
3. Token and Credential Management 
In general, the CSP is responsible for the token and credential 
management activities required to ensure the effectiveness of issuing of token 
and credential.  The list of activities required is as follows:  
a) Credential storage 
This is required for maintenance of credential storage whereby 
there should be protection against unauthorized modification.  It will 
also need to be available for the CSP to perform verification of the 
token owner. 
b) Token and credential verification 
The CSP is required to provide service to requested parties to 
facilitate a token and credential verification process. 
c) Token and credential renewal 
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Tokens and credentials may be issued with limited life span or 
validity period.  During the token renewal, the validity period is 
extended without changing the Subscriber’s token and credential.  
However, in the event that the token type does not support the 
renewal process, a new token will be issued instead.  If the 
credentials or tokens expire prior to the renewal process, the 
Subscriber may be required to go through the registration process 
again to re-establish his identity with the CSP. 
d) Token and credential revocation 
The CSP will need to maintain the revocation status of tokens and 
credentials.  For example, public key certificates are revoked using 
a certificate revocation list (CRL).  The CSP is responsible for 
maintaining an up to date CRL. 
e) Token and credential destruction 
This is required for the destruction of expired tokens and credential 
records.  For credentials, it may be done through an update in the 
credential storage database. Some token types will need to be 
zeroized or destroyed to ensure all information pertaining to the 
Subscriber is deleted from the token, with no means of recovery. 
4. Authentication Process 
The user to be authenticated is usually called a Claimant, and the party 
verifying the identity is called a Verifier.  The Claimant needs to prove to the 
Verifier that he possesses the token through an authentication protocol.  The 
Verifier will then validate the token, possibly by interaction with the Claimant's 
Credential Service Provider, to confirm the Claimant identity.  A Relying Party 
(RP) depends on the CSP or Verifier for the Claimant identity verification in order 
to process a transaction or grant access to some requested information, system 
or physical space.  In some authentication environments, the RP may also serve 
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as the Verifier.  The authentication process is usually facilitated by an 
authentication protocol.  The authentication protocol entails the necessary data 
exchanges and processes that occur between the Claimant and Verifier, and it is 
these protocols that are the main interest of this taxonomy study.   
 
Figure 2.   Authentication Process (After NIST, 2008) 
5. Assertions 
Assertions are statements from a Verifier to a Relying Party that 
contain information about a Subscriber. Assertions are used when 
the Relying Party and the Verifier are not collocated.  The Relying 
Party uses the information in the assertion to identify the Claimant, 
verify any presented/suggested identity attributes, and ultimately 
make authorization decisions regarding Claimant requests for any 
resources controlled by the Relying Party.  (NIST, 2008)  
Assertion mechanisms support federated identity management in which 
there could be multiple identity accounts held by the Subscriber with various 
Relying Parties.  It supports single sign-on and facilitates authentication to be 
performed in lieu of, or in addition to, proof of identity from the Claimant.   
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SAML (Security Assertions Markup Language) is an XML (Extensible 
Markup Language) based framework for exchanging authentication and 
authorization data between security entities over the Internet.   
C. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE 
Several authentication technologies and mechanisms are available.  The 
authentication protocols, just to name a few, include EAP (Extensible 
Authentication Protocol), CHAP (Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol), 
Kerberos, RADIUS (Remote Access Dial-in User Service), and ISAKMP (Internet 
Security Architecture Key Management Protocol).  Each of these authentication 
protocols is designed to provide a means of authentication for different usage 
scenarios and patterns.  Each has its own strengths and weaknesses in terms of 
the number of keys required to generate, cost, complexity, key distribution 
method, security services provided, and vulnerabilities to certain threats such as 
spoofing and replay attacks.  There will be potential security, cost, and scalability 
impacts in selecting one authentication mechanism over another for 
implementation in a particular domain.  The assurance level provided will also 
differ based on the selected authentication factor and underlying protocol 
mechanism. 
This research study attempts to create a taxonomy (classification) for 
currently operational authentication protocols, and show how the taxonomy can 
be leveraged to select appropriate protocols for specific authentication needs for 
a particular environment.  It will provide emphasis on classification based on key 
features, functionality, strengths and potential vulnerabilities.  Analysis will 
include how each protocol achieves or enhances the security objectives of 
integrity.  Examples of use cases are evaluated to put forth how the classification 
can be leveraged to facilitate selection and applicability of the protocol for 
implementation in the targeted environment.   
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II. MECHANICS OF E-AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the current Information Age, IT systems process and store a variety of 
information and provide access to a large number of users.  The systems are 
accessible by different users who may not have access to all the information 
residing on them.  Some information may be sensitive and should only be 
accessible by specific users.  Logical access control to such information needs to 
be in place to control and monitor, by electronic means, the setting of 
permissions on files, folders and data; i.e. who can access what information.  
This differs from physical access control in which physical measures such as 
door locks restrict access to authorized personnel who have the key. 
E-authentication protocols support and facilitate logical access control to 
information by performing the authentication process electronically to ascertain 
that the user is who he/she claims to be, so that subsequent access decisions 
based upon this can be made with greater confidence and assurance.  The 
authentication protocol provides secure communication and data exchange 
between the authenticating parties (Claimant and Verifier/Relying Party) to 
establish the Claimant identity before the Claimant is granted access to the 
information resource.   
The following sections describe the mechanics of a typical e-
authentication protocol.  In examining the mechanics of e-authentication protocol, 
the focus will be on the required message exchanges and transactions between 
the authenticating parties.  In establishing the Claimant identity, it may be via 
presentation of proof of possession of a secret or some physiological trait 
(biometrics).  Cryptographic techniques are employed to protect against 
disclosure of any authentication secret that may be conveyed between the 
authenticating parties.  In some instances, authentication protocols may support  
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multifactor authentication, which typically results in higher assurance of the 
authentication. Lastly, some of the threats that authentication protocols will need 
to address are discussed. 
B. PROOF OF POSSESSION OF A SECRET 
In order to authenticate and confirm the identity of a Claimant, 
presentation of proof of possession (PoP) of a secret is the most common 
mechanism.  E-authentication is based on such proof, which may be 
implemented using a key, password, PIN, etc.  The main essence of employing 
secret-based authentication is that the secret is only known to the Claimant and 
either the Verifier or Relying Party (V/RP), and serves as a form of identifier to 
the authenticating parties.  In the case of shared secrets, the Verifier/Relying 
Party verifies and confirms the Claimant's claim to an identity based on the 
Claimant proving possession of some secret that has been pre-registered with 
the V/RP.  It is assumed that both authenticating parties will protect the secret 
against unauthorized observation. 
The protection of the secret is critical to prevent potential impersonation 
attacks.  The secret is usually encrypted, or used to encrypt, or hashed when 
sent across networks to help maintain its secrecy.  With such protection, the 
Verifier can be more confident that the Claimant is who he claims, if he is able to 
prove possession of this secret. 
1. Symmetric vs. Asymmetric Secret 
The secret used by the Claimant for authentication purposes can be a 
symmetric or asymmetric secret. In performing authentication exchanges 
between the authenticating parties, the symmetric secret is either used to encrypt 
a challenge or is hashed along with the challenge.  Prior key agreement is 
required between the parties to decide on the symmetric key to use or how it can 
be derived for secure exchanges during authentication.  It requires that the secret 
key remain secret at both sides.  The symmetric secret can be static, e.g., a re-
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used password, or it can be dynamic, e.g., a one-time password (OTP).  The 
symmetric secret that is being exchanged may be stored in more than one place.  
It will be stored at least at the Claimant and Verifier’s end, and perhaps at the 
Relying Party too.  In light of the increased exposure of the symmetric secret and 
storage in multiple locations, it will need to be changed periodically if it is of the 
static form (e.g., password or PIN).  A dynamic symmetric secret such as an OTP 
changes frequently by design. 
An asymmetric secret mechanism involves a public and private key pair.  
The public key is publicly available, whereas the Claimant is the only one who 
has access to the corresponding private key.  The keys comprising the pair are 
mathematically related such that data encrypted using one of the keys must be 
decrypted using the other key.  Since the private key is kept in confidence by the 
Claimant, authentication exchanges can then be done to verify whether the 
public key can be used to decrypt any data encrypted by the Claimant’s private 
key.  The public key is made publicly available.  In comparison to symmetric 
secret mechanisms, this reduces the risk of storing the secret at more than one 
place, which leads to less risk of divulging the authenticating secret. 
2. Proof of Possession of Physiological Trait 
Biometrics authentication refers to establishing identity based on 
physiological traits of a person such as their fingerprint, face, iris, voice, 
handwriting, or gait (Jain, 2006) (Gafurov, 2007).  Compared to authentication 
based upon PoP of a secret, biometrics may appear to be more reliable, since 
biometric traits cannot be lost or forgotten.  Biometrics are also able to provide 
for non-repudiation because of the difficulty of forgery of most biometrics and the 
uniqueness of appropriately chosen biometric traits. 
Biometrics, however, are not secrets.  It is generally "public knowledge" 
how a person may look or sound.  For static presentation of biometrics, the 
Verifier will need to authenticate the Claimant using a biometric reader device 
where the Claimant is physically present and, ideally, observed as he/she 
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presents the biometric for measurement.  It is not recommended to use static 
presentation of a biometric for remote authentication (NIST, 2008) in absence of 
a secure communication channel, to protect against the digitized biometric being 
"captured" and replayed later in an impersonation attack.  Protection of biometric 
data is required during transmission and at the Verifier’s storage end.  This is to 
prevent replay and impersonation attacks. There is also a need to prevent 
proliferation and distribution of biometric data that may not be well regulated with 
respect to its linkage to other PII (personally identifiable information), and to 
manage the use of biometrics in authentication over remote networks (Wayman, 
2008).   
In consideration of biometrics used in conjunction with some form of 
challenge response mechanism, this will add some complexity to the 
authentication process as it results in a different authenticating response to each 
authentication transaction, rather than a specific digitized value that could be 
recorded for later use by an attacker.  This will aid in the prevention of replay-
based impersonation attacks. This would be appropriate for remote 
authentication with the correct response to the challenge effectively proving 
possession of the biometric being measured.  In Australia, CentreLink provided a 
voice verification system to authenticate users for its call centre operations 
(Bingemann, 2009).  Besides using voiceprints and pattern recognition software 
to recognize the speaker, it also incorporates additional authentication means 
such as allowing users to submit secret questions, and requesting users to recite 
a string of random numbers as part of the voice-verifying challenge-response 
exchange. 
3. Multifactor Authentication 
Multifactor authentication refers to the presentation of two or more 
authentication factors, such as a biometric used in conjunction with a password.  
It is also considered multifactor authentication if the authentication requires a 
token, the operation of which includes at least two authentication factors.  For 
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example, a biometric is something you are, and a password is something you 
know.  Multifactor authentication is often claimed to be more secure and able to 
meet more stringent security requirements than single factor authentication.  
However, authentication using multiple factors (e.g., biometric and password) 
may not necessarily be more secure than authentication using two or more 
independent means of authentication that happen to be the same factor which 
are both password combinations (Martin, 2009).  
The strength of authentication is dependent on the strength of the 
authentication factor and mechanism, in addition to the level of identity vetting 
done at the time of registration.  It should not be judged solely by the number of 
factors involved.  In some instances, the authentication protocol may support 
multifactor authentication, or more than one instance of authentication using the 
same factor (e.g., entry of a password and a PIN). 
4. Form Factors 
The forms in which the authenticating factors can be stored and 
processed include in physical form or memorization by the human claimant.  
When assessing the form factors for implementation, the assurance level and 
mobility requirements of the authentication factors to be attained will need to be 
considered.  The most frequently employed physical form factors can be 
classified into three types, namely; smart card, mobile device and security fob. 
Authentication protocols do not dictate the form factors, but simply 
addresses how the secret may be stored, or what kind of access/activation 
requirements may be in place.  That is, the form factor typically does not affect 
the underlying mechanics of the PoP protocol. 
C. AUTHENTICATION EXCHANGE MECHANISM 
The authentication exchange is a key process of the e-authentication 
protocol.  It provides the means of communication between authenticating parties 
and facilitates the necessary data exchanges for conduct of authentication based 
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upon PoP of a secret.  The authentication exchange mechanism dictates the 
required transactions and expected data to be sent within the authentication 
process to establish the success or failure of authentication. 
An authentication protocol is often also a cryptographic protocol, as it 
requires the data exchanged between the authenticating parties to be secure 
against disclosure of any secrets and any subsequent impersonation attacks.  
Cryptographic methods deployed in authentication protocols include digital 
signatures, hashes, encryption/decryption, and challenge-response mechanisms, 
to name a few. 
1. Challenge-Response 
Challenge-response is one of the most commonly used authentication 
exchange mechanisms whereby the Verifier will send a challenge to the 
Claimant, and the Claimant is expected to provide a valid answer in response in 
order to be authenticated.  The simplest form of challenge-response is when the 
challenge is asks for a password, and the valid response is to provide the correct 
password directly.  It is also used as a form of assertion other than verifying 
knowledge of a secret.  A CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing Test 
to tell Computers and Humans Apart), for instance, employs a distorted image of 
some text which is sent as a challenge, and the valid response is the correct text.  
A  CAPTCHA is used to determine if the authenticated party is a real human 
rather than a computer program. 
In e-authentication protocols, the challenge-response mechanism is 
typically implemented with one of the cryptographic methods in order to protect 
the authenticating secret from a direct observation attack.  Generally, 
cryptographic methods can be classified into three categories: symmetric key 






Figure 3.   Three Types of Cryptography (From Kessler, 2009) 
Symmetric key cryptography is the most commonly seen in challenge-
response mechanisms.  The challenge-response data exchanges are encrypted 
with a shared secret key known by both parties to prevent eavesdropping.  The 
figure below shows the execution of challenge response exchanges using a 
symmetric key.  Examples of symmetric key cryptography are AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard), DES (Data Encryption Standard) and Triple DES. 
 
Figure 4.   Challenge-Response Using Symmetric Key 
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Challenge-response mechanisms can also be implemented with 
asymmetric keys.  The Verifier encrypts the challenge using the Claimant’s public 
key.  The authentic Claimant is able to decrypt and obtain the challenge using his 
private key as shown in Figure 5.  In a similar fashion, the Verifier may send the 
challenge in the clear (unencrypted), and the Claimant responds by "signing" 
(encrypting with his private key) the challenge. 
 
Figure 5.   Challenge-Response Using Asymmetric Key 
The third alternative is to perform a hash operation on the secret and 
random challenge to create a valid response.  In general, other attributes that 
need to be exchanged during the authentication process may be hashed to 
protect the integrity of the data sent across the network. 
 
Figure 6.   Challenge-Response Using Hash Function 
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2. Zero Knowledge Proof 
Authentication exchange mechanisms that implement zero knowledge 
proofs are also able to prove possession of secrets without the need to 
previously convey the secret to the Verifier.  Hence, the secret is required to be 
stored at the Claimant’s end only.  This maintains the privacy of the secret.  
However, in order for the Verifier to perform verification that the Claimant indeed 
possessed the secret, a password verifier will need to be provided by the 
Claimant to the Verifier beforehand.  The password verifier can be generated 
based on mathematical computation. 
The zero knowledge proof is based on the properties of completeness and 
soundness.  The completeness property refers to the Claimant following the 
protocol closely in order for the Verifier to be convinced by the Claimant.  The 
soundness property refers to the Claimant’s ability to prove to the Verifier based 
on a high probability of success.  In the well-known simplistic example, Victor 
(Verifier) needs to be convinced that Carol (Claimant) knows the secret password 
to the door connecting paths A and B.  If Carol is able to enter from the path A 
and exit from path B, Victor will be convinced that Carol indeed knows the secret 
password.  The completeness property is illustrated in the example of a protocol 
that requires Victor to specify the entrance path for Carol to start with, and Carol 
is able follow the protocol and unlock the door with the secret password without 
revealing it to Victor.  The soundness property is shown in the sense that Carol 
really knows the secret password if she is able to do this repeatedly, eliminating 
the probability that Carol may be cheating. 
In e-authentication protocols, the zero knowledge proof implementation 
relies on some mathematical computational model.  The protocols are based on 
hard mathematical problems such as computing the discrete logarithm of large 
numbers, factorization of numbers, computing the product of large prime 
numbers, etc. 
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3. Out-of-Band Authentication 
Out-of-band authentication uses two separate networks simultaneously to 
authenticate a user.  It allows the use of less secure methods of communicating 
with the user, and prevents impersonation where the attacker will not only need 
secret credentials to access the first network, but also require secret credentials 
to access the second (out-of-band with the first) network (Authentify Technology, 
2009).   
This dual authentication mechanism applies mainly to online transactions, 
in particular banking transactions (Imperial College London, n.d.).  This is 
implemented by generating a telephone call (the in-band network) followed by an 
e-mail, or a text message (the out-of-band network) to the user.  A typical 
example is where the user inputs his secret credentials for online authentication, 
and subsequently receives a Short Message Service (SMS) message on his 
mobile phone.  He will then be required to input the one-time password sent via 
the SMS as a form of authentication confirmation to complete his authentication 
process for an online banking transaction.   
 
Figure 7.   Example of Out-of-band Authentication 
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4. One-way vs. Mutual Authentication 
Authentication can take place in a one-way manner whereby only one 
party (the RP/Verifier) authenticates the other (the Claimant).  In mutual 
authentication, each party has a "stake" in authenticating the other, and thus both 
parties are RP/Verifier and RP.  In the general Web server instance, only one-
way authentication is performed (the client authenticates the server as a 
precursor to sending personal/financial information).  Mutual authentication is 
performed with the authentication exchange mechanism done twice, i.e. doing 
the one-way authentication in both directions.  It is more secure for authentication 
to be done both ways such that both the client and server are assured of the 
authenticity of the other party. 
D. PROTECTION AGAINST THREATS 
In order for e-authentication protocols to be effective in facilitating 
communication and data exchanges between authenticating parties, they need to 
address and protect against the authentication threats.  Most e-authentication 
protocols perform verification and validation to protect against authentication 
threats such as non-repudiation and impersonation attacks.   
Cryptographic techniques are used to protect the integrity and 
confidentiality of the data being exchanged, and to provide non-repudiation.  
Symmetric key cryptography can provide confidentiality, authentication and data 
integrity but not non-repudiation.  In comparison, asymmetric key cryptography is 
able to provide these three security objectives as well as non-repudiation.  There 
are also other supporting elements such as random number generation, nonces2, 
and timestamps that play a significant role within the authentication process to 
prevent impersonation attacks. 
                                            
2 A nonce is a pseudo random number used in authentication protocol to protect against 
replay attacks and is seldom reused.  In some protocols, each client may have a unique 
sequence number to generate the nonce. 
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1. Impersonation Protection 
An impersonation attack is the most fundamental threat to address in 
authentication.  The whole purpose of authentication is to verify identity and 
ensure that the person is who he claims to be.  Well-designed e-authentication 
protocol exchanges that result in a Claimant proving possession of pre-registered 
secrets serve to validate the Claimant's "claim" of an identity, and thus prevent 
impersonation attacks. 
2. Replay Protection 
In the authentication perspective, replay attacks are whereby an adversary 
can replay valid, previously captured, authentication data in a subsequent 
authentication session initiated by the impersonator. Replay attacks can be 
prevented using hash functions that together with a nonce or a timestamp, or 
both.  Hash functions are one-way, irreversible functions that support the ability 
to compare data contents to identify any modifications, whether accidental or 
intentional.   
3. Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is an information security objective that is intended to 
preclude any party that participates in an online/electronic transaction from being 
able to deny such participation.  It is best implemented with digital signature that 
employ a hash function, a trusted timestamp, and asymmetric key cryptography.  
Digital signing is performed using the sender’s private key.  By signing the data 
(i.e., encrypting the hash of the data) to be sent along with a timestamp, the 
recipient can verify and confirm the sender of the data by successfully decrypting 
the signed data using the sender's certified public key. By keeping the data and 
corresponding signature on file, the recipient is able to prove not only that the 
sender did in fact send the data, but also the time at which it was sent. 
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III. AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS – KEY PLAYERS 
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS 
An authentication protocol entails a sequence of messages exchanged 
between two parties that allow the use/possession of some secret to be 
confirmed (Clark and Jacob, 1997).  An authentication protocol is also defined as 
a type of cryptographic protocol with the purpose of authenticating parties 
wishing to communicate securely (Authentication Protocol, 2009).  It is almost 
certain that any authentication protocol will be dependent on parameters such as 
names and identities of the authenticating parties, and any secrets shared 
between them. It is common for public-private key pairs to be used for initial 
authentication, followed by the establishment and/or transfer of a shared 
symmetric secret that will be used for the remainder of the session to provide for 
the integrity and confidentiality of all communicated data. 
There are several authentication protocols and mechanisms available.  
The authentication protocols, just to name a few, include SSL/TLS, Kerberos, 
EAP, CHAP, RADIUS, IPSec, etc.  Each of these authentication protocols 
employs some common mechanisms for performing authentication, though the 
implementation may differ in terms of strength and processes involved.  Almost 
all authentication protocols have the feature of using either pre-shared or derived 
secrets to conduct the identity authentication process.  They usually leverage 
such cryptographic entities as random number generation, hash functions, 
challenges, nonces and timestamps to enhance the strength or add functionality 
to the protocol.  As a further protocol comparison, some protocols may be 
stateful in facilitating authenticated session resumption, while others may be 
stateless and require periodic re-authentication. 
Authentication protocols can be categorized from an application 
perspective or from the perspective of providing user access to the network and 
infrastructure.  There is typically a separate authentication process for 
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authentication at the datalink or network layers, compared with the application 
layer.  Authentication for access to the network and infrastructure does not 
necessarily provide access to applications and services (Todorov, 2007).  
However, the basic idea of authentication via PoP of secrets applies and remains 
the same for all categories of authentication protocols, regardless of the layer at 
which the authentication mechanism is implemented. 
The authentication protocol key players surveyed here are a sample of the 
various categories of authentication protocols available.  These key players span 
from standard protocols for applications and network access, to specific 
operating system protocols, to independent authentication protocols and to 
proprietary protocols.  The focus will be on the underlying authentication 
mechanism, and will assume that the authenticating parties have already 
established all required prior configuration, certificate issuances, shared secret 
key agreement or key distribution requirements. 
B. PAP 
The Password Authentication Protocol (PAP) is a simple authentication 
protocol used to authenticate a user to a network access server.  In general, 
almost all network operating system remote servers support PAP, but it is seldom 
used.  This is due to its insecure nature, as the passwords transmitted over the 
network for authentication are unencrypted and thus offer no protection against 
impersonation attacks.  The client just sends his user name and password, and 
the server will send an authentication acknowledgement after verifying the 
credentials. 
 
Figure 8.   PAP Simple Authentication Message Transaction 
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C. IPSEC-ISAKMP 
IPSec is considered a meta protocol, which outlines a framework for use 
of other constituent/component protocols that are developed to provide 
functionality in specific areas such as authentication, cryptographic key 
exchange, or key management. 
The Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
combines the security concepts of authentication, key management and security 
associations to establish secure communications in an Internet environment.  
ISAKMP defines procedures and packet formats for key exchange to establish, 
negotiate, and manage security associations.  A security association (SA) 
describes the security services that are to be established and utilized between 
two or more parties.  SA attributes include items such as the identity of the 
authenticated party, authentication mechanism, cryptographic algorithm, key 
length, sequence number, and so on. 
ISAKMP is distinct from key exchange protocols; this is to separate the 
details of security association management and key management from the 
details of key exchange.  It is a framework for protocols rather than a protocol 
itself, as the defined formats provide a consistent framework in key exchange 
and authentication data, but may utilize several of a number of protocols within 
this framework.  It is independent of any specific key exchange protocol, 
encryption algorithm, or authentication mechanism.  This provides for 
extensibility in supporting future (or patched/upgraded) algorithms when they 
may become available, and provides for flexibility in being able to support many 
combinations of mechanisms and algorithms to fulfill the needs of any specific 
SA. 
A simplified illustration of the ISAKMP framework building block is shown 
in Figure 9.  ISAKMP has basic requirements for authentication mechanisms 
such as strong authentication and digital signatures.  It does not however dictate  
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any specific authentication protocol within the authentication component.  The 
authentication mechanisms to prove possession of a secret can be via symmetric 
or asymmetric means.  
 
Figure 9.   ISAKMP Framework 
There are five default message exchanges defined under ISAKMP, 
namely: Base Exchange, Identity Protection Exchange, Authentication Only 
Exchange, Aggressive Exchange and Information Exchange (Maughan, et al., 
1998).  The Base Exchange allows key exchange and authentication information 
to be transmitted together.  The Identity Protection Exchange separates key 
exchange and authentication information with identity protection.  The key 
exchange is performed with a nonce to protect against replay attacks.  The 
Authentication Only Exchange is used for mutual authentication without key 
exchange.  The Aggressive Exchange minimizes message exchanges by 
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allowing security association, key exchange and authentication information to be 
transmitted together without identity protection.  The Informational Exchange is 
used for one-way transmission of information, mainly used for security 
association management. 
D. IPSEC-IKE 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is used for performing mutual authentication 
using some long-term secret key (symmetric secret key, public signature key, or 
public encryption key) and creates an SA by establishing shared secret keys.  An 
SA is considered unidirectional.  For a communication session between two 
parties, the session will consist of two SAs, one in each direction (Kaufman, 
Perlman and Speciner, 2002).  
IKE defines two phases; the primary objective of Phase 1 is to achieve 
mutual authentication and establish session keys between the two authenticating 
parties.  Phase 2 leverages the established session keys to facilitate multiple 
security associations and multiple connections with varying security properties. 
In Phase 1, the exchanges and key establishment can occur in one of two 
modes.  Both modes leverage Diffie-Hellman key exchange to establish a 
session key.  Diffie-Hellman is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties to 
establish a shared secret key by exchanging messages over an unsecure 
channel. Aggressive mode performs the cryptographic key selection and 
authentication between Claimant and Verifier in three messages.  The proof of 
identity by the Verifier and Claimant consists of some hash of the pre-shared 
secret key associated with their identity, the Diffie-Hellman values and nonces.  
This establishes the Diffie-Hellman session key and verifies that both parties 
know the shared secret.   
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Figure 10.   IKE Phase 1 – Aggressive Mode 
Main mode does the same thing in six messages, whereby the Claimant 
may propose the cryptographic methods (encryption algorithm, hash algorithm, 
etc) supported, and the Verifier responds with its choice.  IKE in Phase 1 
establishes two session keys, an integrity key and an encryption key.  With 
Phase 1 completed, the mutual authentication process is completed, and the IKE 
security association is set up between Claimant and Verifier.   
 
 
Figure 11.   IKE Phase 1 – Main Mode 
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For Phase 2, there is only one mode known as the quick mode exchange.  
It is used to negotiate protection keys for IPSec.  Either the Claimant or Verifier 
can initiate an IPSec security association.  The IPSec security association is 
considered unidirectional and consists of the cryptographic key, identity of the 
other end, sequence number, cryptographic algorithm used, etc.  This phase 
involves negotiating crypto parameters and an identifying security parameter 
index (SPI).  The SPI is used to uniquely identify the security association.   
Diffie-Hellman exchange is optional in this phase.  Phase 2 protocol 
exchanges are accomplished in three messages.  Phase 2 exchanges include 
the sending nonce and other information which; together with the key material 
seed computed in the IKE Phase 1, are used to compute and generate the 
integrity and encryption keys for the IPSec security association.  All messages in 
Phase 2 are encrypted with the encryption key established during Phase 1. 
 
 
Figure 12.   IKE Phase 2 – Quick Mode 
1. Photuris 
Photuris is a session key management protocol for IPSec and was one of 
the potential candidates for IKE.  The protocol establishes session keys between 
two communicating parties without the need to exchange the session keys over 
the communicating medium.  The authentication mechanism is based on a 
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shared secret key between the communicating parties using Diffie-Hellman and 
cookies.  Photuris' use of cookies was designed to provide some form of 
protection for denial of service attacks.  A cookie can be a chosen random 
number sent by the party who initiated the communication or the receiving party 
to ensure the source IP address of the initiator and to track the communication 
connection.  The protocol also provided for the cookie to be stateless.  The 
cookie can be the output of a hash function that uses the IP addresses of 
communicating parties and a secret known only to the cookie owner (Kaufman, 
Perlman and Speciner, 2002).  In this case the cookie owner does not need to 
"remember" the cookies that have been sent; the cookies can simply be 
computed on-the-fly based on the destination party's IP address. 
The initial message exchanges include cookies, crypto negotiation, and 
Diffie-Hellman data used to establish the session key.  Thereafter, the session 
key is used to encrypt any other security parameters exchanged between the two 
parties.  The session keys generated by the Photuris protocol are meant to be 
short-lived since the secrets, known only to the cookie owner, may be reused for 
several communication connections.  The session key may be changed 
periodically through additional message exchanges (P. Karn, 1999). 
 
Figure 13.   Photuris – Simplified protocol exchanges 
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2. Oakley 
Oakley is a key determination protocol that is designed to work within the 
ISAKMP framework.  The protocol aims to establish a secret key between 
authenticated parties that can serve for a long lifespan.  The three key 
components of the protocol are the cookie exchange, Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange and authentication (Orman, 1998).  This is similar to Photuris in using 
Diffie-Hellman for the key exchange mechanism for deriving a shared secret key 
as well as using cookie exchange in preventing denial of service attacks.   
The method of authentication can be via digital signatures, public key 
encryption, or an out-of-band symmetric key.  Both authenticating parties can 
exchange nonces and a pre-shared secret key to achieve the authentication and 
derive keying material.  PoP of an asymmetric secret is used if non-repudiation is 
required.  
E. SSL/TLS 
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) / Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an 
authentication protocol that allows two parties to authenticate and establish a 
shared secret key used for a secure communication session.  SSL/TLS is a 
stateful protocol where the client and server maintain current connection state 
information.  SSL/TLS runs over TCP and is usually used to authenticate and 
protect data exchanges between client and server.   
SSL/TLS begins with an initial handshaking phase between the client and 
server to negotiate the protocol version, cryptographic algorithm, and a random 
number.  After that is the key exchange and authentication phase, where the 
server public key certificate is sent to the client for verification and a shared 
secret session key (master secret key) is created based on a random number 
selected by both parties.   
The authentication is performed as follows: the client challenges the 
server by encrypting a selected random number (pre-master secret, S) with the 
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server public key, and by encrypting some keyed hash of messages with the 
master secret key.  The server authenticates to the client by being able to 
decrypt the pre-master secret with its private key to obtain S, and it subsequently 
generates the Master secret key (K) which it uses to decrypt the keyed hash of 
messages.  The server responds with the decrypted keyed hash of messages to 
complete the authentication process.  Henceforth, both parties use this shared 
secret session key to derive keys for encryption and integrity protection in their 
subsequent secure communication and data exchange.  This is typical of most 
authentication protocols that leverage public key encryption for initial exchange of 
authentication info and that generate a shared secret key for subsequent 
communication and data exchanges.  
 
Figure 14.   Simplified SSL/TLS typical authentication exchange 
SSL/TLS allows session resumption when a session terminates, and the 
client wants to re-establish the session with the same server using the same 
connection parameters.  The client will initiate the session resumption during the 
handshake process using the previous session ID.  The server will need to 
maintain some state based on the previous authenticated session and replies 
with the same session ID if willing to resume the session.  Both parties can then 
perform data exchanges based on previous session shared secret keys, resulting 
in a shortened handshaking process.  If the server does not recognize the 
session ID, a different session ID is sent to the client followed by the complete 
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handshaking process (Kaufman, Perlman and Speciner, 2002). The previous 
session in this case is then non-resumable. 
 
Figure 15.   Session Resumption (using previous session ID) 
Another key aspect for authentication is that it uses X.509 certificates for 
peer-to-peer authentication and is able to support both one-way and mutual 
authentication (Todorov, 2007).  In most commercial deployments, it is usually 
one-way authentication where only the client authenticates the server.  Mutual 
authentication, though supported, is seldom used.   
F. KERBEROS 
Kerberos is a secret key-based authentication protocol for networks.  A 
Kerberos implementation consists of a Key Distribution Center (KDC) deployed 
at a secure physical site in the network.  A KDC works as a trusted third party to 
facilitate parties who wish to authenticate and communicate securely with one 
another.  When Alice wishes to talk to Bob, she will need to go through the KDC 
to obtain a session key.  The KDC is responsible for generating a shared secret 
key (master key) for Alice and Bob's secure communication session. 
Suppose a client initiates a request to the KDC to establish a 
communication session with a server.  The KDC will generate a shared secret 
session key for the client and server.  The shared secret key and client name are 
encrypted using the client and server’s already established shared secret key 
(long-term secret password).  This is referred to as a Kerberos ticket.  Based on 
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this ticket, the client and server can authenticate each other, and they are able to 
use the shared session key for subsequent communication. 
 
Figure 16.   Kerberos Authentication Process 
In the request to the KDC for a session key, the KDC sends a ticket 
granting ticket (TGT) which includes the session key and other information such 
as the TGT expiration time.  This is to restrict the validity time of the session key 
so that even if it is compromised, it is only for a limited period.  This session key 
and TGT can be used for later service requests to access the services or 
resources without the need to do re-authentication (Todorov, 2007).  The ticket 
lifetime can be specified to restrict the validity of the ticket.  Kerberos prevents 
replay attacks with the current timestamp on its service tickets.  However, there 
is a need to synchronize time on all involved authenticating parties (KDCs, clients 
and servers) to support the usage of timestamps.   
In accessing and seeking authentication to a server in a remote realm or 
domain, a client can be authenticated using referral tickets generated by the 
client local KDC.  The client will use this TGT from his own domain and present it 
to the KDC in the targeted domain.  Upon verifying the TGT presented and 
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determining if the requested server access is within its realm, the remote KDC 
will issue another TGT to the client.  Using this newly issued TGT, the client is 
able to access the remote server.  The inter-realm trust relationships is built in a 
stateless way by TGT, timestamp on the service ticket and the trusted third party 
concept based on the deployed KDCs.   
G. SRP 
Secure Remote Password Protocol (SRP) is a non-disclosing, secure 
password-based authentication protocol.  The protocol facilitates a client 
authenticating to a server based on a zero-knowledge proof and without need of 
a trusted third party.  The key feature of this protocol is that there is no need to 
reveal the actual secret password of the client to anyone.  The authentication 
depends on the password verifier that is generated by the client to be pre-shared 
with the server.  Note that this verifier is a necessary constituent building-block 
enabling verification of the client's secret, but it is not the secret itself.  The server 
authenticates the client based on this password verifier to verify that the client 
indeed possesses the secret password.  It is considered a non-disclosing 
authentication protocol and offers complete protection against both passive and 
active attacks (T. Wu, 2000).  SRP is based on a computationally difficult 
mathematical model and large random number properties to achieve the zero 
knowledge proof. 
In general, the client initiates the authentication protocol.  Upon 
identification to the server, the client will receive the salt3 stored in the server 
under her username.  The client generates a random number, raises a primitive 
root modulo the power of the selected random number and sends the result to 
the server.  This is done similarly at the server’s end in addition to the password 
verifier associated with the client.  Both sides are then able to construct a shared  
 
                                            
3 Salt refers to random bits or random number used in cryptography or some derivation 
function to generate secret key. 
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session key.  Thereafter, they need only to prove to each other that their keys 
match to complete authentication. This enables both parties to communicate 
securely after successful authentication. 
 
 N    Large prime number 
 g    Primitive root modulo N 
  s    Client's salt 
  P    Client’s password 
  H()  One-way hash function 
  ^    (Modular) Exponentiation 
  u    Random number 
  a,b  Secret ephemeral values 
  A,B  Public ephemeral values 
  x    Client’s private key 
  v    Password verifier 
  S    Shared secret session key 
 
Figure 17.   SRP Authentication Process (After T. Wu, 1997) 
In this protocol, only the client generates a secret password and computes 
a corresponding verifier.  To establish a password verifier with the server, the 
client picks a random salt and computes the hash based on the secret password 
and salt.  The password verifier is the result of the computation of the primitive 
root modulo.  The server will have a verifier for each client that allows it to 
authenticate the respective client.  If this verifier is compromised, the attacker will 
still not be able to impersonate the client due to the one-way function on the 
secret password to create the verifier (T. Wu, 1997). 
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The password verifier in this protocol can be seen as a pre-shared secret 
between the client and the server.  It acts as the key authentication factor that 
allows the server to authenticate the client.  From another perspective, such an 
authentication mechanism is similar to PKI authentication using public-private 
keys.  The secret password in this case is analogous to the private key, and the 
password verifier is analogous to the public key. In addition, the secret password 
and password verifier are mathematically related.  Similar to the public key 
distribution concept, the password verifier can be publicly distributed to 
whomever needs to authenticate the client.  Conceptually, asymmetric secret 
authentication seems applicable to this protocol, taking a different form of 
implementation. 
Unlike authentication using asymmetric secrets, trusted key servers and 
certificate management infrastructures are not required.  It also prevents the 
need to store the client’s secret password at more than one location for 
authentication purposes.  The secret password never leaves the client’s local 
machine, and there is no need to store the secret password at the server’s end.  
Thus, it is protected against password database attacks at the server, preventing 
a stolen password from being used in an impersonation attack. 
H. TELNET 
Telnet authentication is a very simple process that consists of a primitive 
login where the server requests both username and password, and the user 
provides both in plaintext.  This is similar to the PAP. 
Subsequent versions of Telnet support authentication options that provide 
mechanisms for more secure authentication negotiation between the client and 
server (Todorov, 2007).  This allows the client and server to agree on specific 
authentication protocols for credential exchange, proof of identity and 
subsequent data protection.  The supported authentication protocols include 
Kerberos, SRP, SSL, among others. 
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Figure 18.   Telnet Authentication – Using Authentication Option 
I. SSH 
The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol provides a secure (encrypted and 
authenticated) channel to facilitate remote login over unsecured networks and 
allows secure data exchange between two hosts or networked devices.  It was 
designed to facilitate protected data exchanges for applications, such as Telnet, 
that lack built-in authentication and data protection.  Typically, SSH uses public 
key cryptography to authenticate remote users.  The client verifies the identity of 
the server using the public and private key pair.   
The transport layer authentication deals mainly with server authentication 
with an asymmetric key pair. The two SSH versions are similar in terms of how 
authentication is done; the only difference is in the way the session key is 
generated (Todorov, 2007). 
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Figure 19.   SSH Server Authentication 
Once the transport layer negotiation completes, user authentication is 
performed.  The supported authentication methods include Public Key 
authentication, Host authentication, Password authentication, and none (Ylonen 
and C. Lonvick, 2006).  Public Key authentication is the default authentication 
mechanism that SSH clients and servers are required to support.  Both Public 
Key and Host authentication leverage an asymmetric key pair for authentication.  
The client authenticates to the server by encrypting the authentication request 
message with the client private key.  The server verifies and responds with 
authentication success if the request message is decrypted using the client 
public key.  Host authentication is similar with the authentication request from a 
remote host signed using the remote host private key.  The Password 
authentication method provides for user authentication using a plaintext 
username and password.  It is considered secure to use plaintext for 
authentication since SSH is a secure communication channel.  The server may 
also use external—3rd party—authentication protocols (e.g., Kerberos) for the 
user authentication process. 
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Figure 20.   SSH User Authentication – Public Key Authentication 
J. CHAP 
The Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP) defines an 
authentication method, which uses a random challenge with a cryptographically 
hashed response constructed using the challenge and a secret key (Simpson, 
1996).  The challenge-response mechanism provides protection against replay 
attacks through the use of an incrementally changing identifier and a variable 
challenge value.  The authentication method depends upon a shared secret 
known only to the Claimant and Verifier.  This secret is not sent over the 
communication link.  Although the authentication is typically one-way, by 
negotiating CHAP in both directions the same shared secret is used for mutual 
authentication. 
 
Figure 21.   CHAP Authentication Process 
 39
Both parties will need access to the shared secret in order to generate the 
required hash for CHAP authentication.  This will mean that the plaintext shared 
secret will need to be stored by both Claimant and Verifier.  This creates a 
vulnerability to password database attack.  Microsoft came up with its own 
version of CHAP (MS-CHAP) which rather than being a completely separate 
authentication protocol, simply use a different algorithm for generating the hash 
(Zorn, 2000). 
K. EAP 
The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is an authentication 
framework that supports multiple authentication methods.  The EAP framework is 
flexible in allowing the Verifier to determine the specific authentication method to 
be used rather than supporting one specific authentication mechanism.  EAP 
defines four types of packets, namely request, response, success, and failure 
(Aboba, et al., 2004).  The Verifier issues request packets, and a response 
packet is obtained from the Claimant.  The Verifier sends success or failure 
packets after completion of the authentication procedures.  EAP also supports 
backend authentication servers that implement some or all authentication 
methods.  This serves as pass-through authentication to send to the remote EAP 
authentication server, which may be using protocol such as RADIUS.  This 
facilitates centralized management of authentication for large numbers of 
Verifiers. 
The three authentication EAP types – MD5 challenge, OTP, and GTC are 
not considered sufficiently secure for typical uses; this applies in particular to 
wireless environments (JANET Technical Sheets, 2007).  The MD5 challenge is 
a challenge-response messaging mechanism.  OTP is similar but uses a one-
time password in the challenge-response mechanism.  Generic Token Card 




Figure 22.   Example of EAP Authentication (From JANET Technical  
Sheets, 2007) 
As with all EAP mechanisms, the initial authentication phase is 
unencrypted and not protected.  Some of the more secure types used are EAP 
Transport Layer Security (EAP-TLS), Protected EAP (PEAP) and Tunneled TLS 
(TTLS) (Todorov, 2007).  EAP-TLS is an authentication mechanism that uses a 
user's certificate to authenticate the Claimant to the server/Verifier.  EAP-TTLS is 
an extension that allows authentication using other authentication mechanisms 
such as PAP or CHAP.  PEAP and EAP-TTLS are similar in using TLS for server 
authentication and encryption. Neither PEAP nor EAP-TTLS require user 
certificates by using another authentication protocol between the Claimant and 
server that is protected by TLS encryption. 
L. RADIUS 
Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS) is an authentication 
protocol used in network environments, commonly used for embedded devices 
such as routers, modem servers, switches, etc.  It is a widely accepted de-facto 
standard for remote authentication and authorization to infrastructure access.  A 
RADIUS server is typically responsible for accepting user connection requests 
and authenticating users to facilitate delivering service to users after successful 
authentication (Rigney, et al., 2000). 
RADIUS is a stateless protocol utilizing a model of trust based on a 
shared secret between client and server, and it permits using the same shared 
secret by many clients.  By allowing the use of the same shared secret, this 
results in a single compromised client, effectively compromising other clients who 
 41
share the same secret (Hill, 2001).  Typical authentication is via simple 
authentication using user password or a challenge response mechanism 
(Todorov, 2007).  
 
Figure 23.   Challenge Response Authentication Using RADIUS 
M. NTLM 
NTLM is an authentication protocol by Microsoft and is primarily used by 
Microsoft operating systems.  It requires a secure channel and a persistent TCP 
connection between trusted parties for client-server authentication.  The general 
NTLM authentication process involves shared secret processing between 
authenticating parties, a challenge-response mechanism, and the computation of 
NT and LM (Lan Manager) hash values.  NTLM typically uses a derivative of the 
client password to encrypt a challenge string.  The authentication mechanism is 




Figure 24.   NTML Authentication Process 
N. TACACS+ 
TACACS+ (Terminal Access Controller Access-Control System Plus) is a 
protocol that provides access control for routers, network access servers, and 
other networked computing devices via one or more centralized servers. 
TACACS+ provides separate authentication, authorization, and accounting (AAA) 
services. 
The key differences between TACACS+ and RADIUS are that TACACS+ 
separates authentication and authorization operations, whereas RADIUS 
combines them.  Further, TACACS+ uses TCP while RADIUS uses UDP.  The 
similarity is that TACACS+ authentication is also based on a shared secret 
between an infrastructure devices and the TACACS+ server.  The shared secret 
is used to authenticate both the client and server by encrypting the 
communication between both parties.  The assumption is that the client is 
considered authenticated if it can successfully decrypt messages sent to it.  The 
same applies to authenticating the server.  There is an anti-replay mechanism by 
means of packet sequence numbers used to calculate the protection key; 
however, they are easily predictable since the sequence numbers always start 
from 1 (Todorov, 2007). 
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Figure 25.   TACACS+ Authentication Process 
O. WIRELESS AUTHENTICATION 
Under the 802.11 standard, the two main authentication methods to 
access the Wi-Fi infrastructure are open authentication and shared key 
authentication.  The open authentication method is almost equivalent to no 
authentication at all.  No verification of the client’s requesting a connection is 
required for a Wi-Fi access point to grant connection access.  However, if Wired 
Equivalent Privacy (WEP) or Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) is configured for the 
network, the client will not be able to connect to the infrastructure unless the 
encryption key for WEP or WPA is known.  WEP and WPA are enabled to protect 
the data traffic within the wireless network.  The data protection algorithm mainly 
consists of deriving a common secret key between the client and the access 
point (Todorov, 2007). 
The shared key authentication is based on a challenge-response 
mechanism.  The access point sends a random challenge to the client for 
authentication.  The client uses WEP to encrypt the received challenge and 
returns it to the access point.  However, WEP resulted in an attacker’s ability to 
recover and decrypt other parties’ encrypted message even without knowing the 
encryption key used between the two parties (Goldberg, 2001).   
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The WPA/WPA2 pre-shared key method is used instead.  It is similar to 
the WEP concept in that the client and the access point share a common secret 
key.  The secret key is used to authenticate the client as well as for protecting 
user data in terms of data traffic encryption and ensuring data integrity. 
 
Figure 26.   WPA Pre-shared Key Authentication Process 
P. VPN AUTHENTICATION 
A Virtual Private Network (VPN) connects two remotely located endpoints 
together across a public network.  The authentication protocols used for VPN are 
typically, PAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP, EAP and SSL (Lancaster, 2002).   
In general, authentication takes place primarily at the transport and 
application level.  First, transport level authentication is performed through the 
exchange of computer certificates or a pre-shared key (IPSec-IKE) during the 
establishment of the IPSec security association.  This is followed by application 
level authentication, in which the remote access client that requests the VPN 
connection is authenticated through the use of a Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) 
authentication method (EAP, CHAP, MS-CHAP).  These authentication protocols 
are covered in the earlier sections of this chapter.  Upon successful 
authentication, a secured VPN tunnel is established between the client and the 
server.   
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Q. GSM AUTHENTICATION 
The Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is a standard for 
digital cellular services.  Authentication and encryption are integrated into GSM 
through the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card and serve to identify the 
subscriber.  The SIM card includes subscriber information and the International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), which is a unique 15-digit code, used to 
identify an individual user on a GSM network (GSM Security FAQ, 2003). 
A3 is the authentication algorithm used in GSM systems.   It is secret key 
based and authenticates using a challenge response mechanism.  The A3 
authentication algorithm takes the random challenge received by the SIM as one 
of its inputs. The other input is the secret key residing in the SIM. From these two 
inputs, the A3 algorithm generates the secret response.  COMP128 is the default 
algorithm implementation for the A3 algorithm used by GSM network operators 
for authentication and key exchange (Thakker, n.d.) (Chen, 2002). 
GSM authentication is based upon symmetric keys that have been pre-
loaded onto each subscriber’s SIM chip.  All subscribers’ keys are also stored in 
several HLRs (home location registers) that are under the control of the phone 
network. The A3 algorithm runs on the SIM, computing cryptographic 
authentication responses when necessary.  Only legitimate SIM chips can 
provide the correct response to the random challenge.  Also, the IMSI of every 










Figure 27.   GSM Authentication Process 
R. E-VOTING AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL 
Performing e-voting transactions over the internet is being continually 
refined, and in particular, the authentication protocol to support this type of 
transaction.  An e-voting authentication protocol requires the classic information 
security properties of protection against impersonation, observation, and 
modification attacks. Additionally, a unique property required for an e-voting 
authentication protocol is deniability.  A deniable authentication protocol allows 
the receiver to authenticate the sender of a message in a way that the receiver is 
unable to prove the source of the message to a third party.  This is critical to 
ensure the privacy of a vote. 
There are several proposed deniable authentication protocols, which are 
based on zero-knowledge proofs, factoring, or a discrete logarithm.  The 
following shows an example of a proposed deniable authentication protocol 
based on a discrete logarithm problem (Meng, 2009).   
During the initialization phase, the Authority is required to choose a large 
prime number as well as to compute a random number.  Based on the large 
prime number and random number posted by the Authority, as well as a random 
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number picked by the sender, the sender computes his public and private keys.  
The sender may compute a series of public keys based on a series of random 
numbers and post these public keys publicly.   
During protocol execution, the sender randomly picks a public and private 
key from his series of key pairs generated previously.  A hash is computed based 
on his private key and vote message.  The Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
is then computed based on the receiver’s public key, the hash from the previous 
computation, and the vote message.  Then, the sender public key, MAC and vote 
message are sent to the receiver.  The sender “forgets” the used private key after 
a certain time.  The MAC serves to ensure integrity of the vote message, with the 
sender public key indicating which key pair the sender used in this transaction. 
The sender’s ability to deny having ever authenticated anything to the 
receiver is based on the multiple key pairs generated.  Also, the sender will be 
unable to provide his private key since the sender “forgets” it after each 
transaction.  The authentication mechanism in this protocol is based on 
asymmetric key authentication with a variant from the typical public-private key 
authentication in that there is more than one key pair generated per user, and the 
asymmetric keys are short-lived.   
 
Figure 28.   Example of E-Voting Protocol Authentication 
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S. MIFARE PROPRIETARY PROTOCOL 
Mifare Classic is a commonly used contactless smart card, used mainly 
for payment in public transportation systems.  Contactless cards are based on 
Radio Frequency Identification Technology (RFID).  The Mifare Classic RFID 
chips use a mutual authentication process to authenticate both the card and 
reader.  The proprietary protocol design and implementation details are kept 
secret.   
Through a study and experiments conducted to analyze the 
communication between the card and the reader, it was discovered that the 
Mifare Classic uses symmetric keys and that there exists a weaknesses in its 
psuedo-random generator (Gans, Hoepman and Garcia, 2008).  This weakness 
enables the recovery of keystreams (i.e., temporary keys derived from long term 
keys) without knowing the long-term encryption key.  It was discovered that the 
authentication protocol performs a four-step mutual authentication between the 
card and reader that can be subjected to a replay attack.  A trace of a successful 
authentication can be replayed multiple times until a challenge nonce equal to 
one processed in the original (recorded) trace is provided by the authenticator. 
 
Figure 29.   Mifare Classic Authentication Process 
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IV. BUILDING AN AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL TAXONOMY 
A. NEED FOR A TAXONOMY 
There are several e-authentication protocols available.  Each protocol is 
designed for a specific application and operating environment to ascertain the 
identity of the requestor and to thus protect access to resources and data.  
Depending on the e-authentication protocol mechanisms implemented, the 
protocol can achieve a certain security assurance level in providing reliable 
identity verification.  The authentication protocols also incorporate mechanisms 
to address common authentication threats such as repudiation, impersonation, 
modification, and observation attacks. 
The taxonomy for the e-authentication protocols is to facilitate 
understanding of the protocol characteristics and the intrinsic mechanisms 
involved in the authentication operation.  The classification enables one to 
distinguish the similarities and differences among these authentication protocols 
and to provide some basis for protocol evaluation and/or selection.  This can be 
leveraged to assess and select potential protocols for specific system 
requirements and problem domain deployment. 
B. CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA 
There are many ways that e-authentication protocols can be classified.  
The basis for classification is dependent on the application of the developed 
taxonomy.  With the objective of using this developed taxonomy for the selection 
of potential authentication protocols to meet specific system requirements or 
problem domains, the proposed classification is based on performing a functional 
decomposition of the protocol.   
The focus is placed on examining the authentication transactions that are 
required between the authenticating parties.  Functional decomposition serves to 
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identify the functions and mechanisms of the protocol in facilitating the 
authentication process.  In addition, key data elements are identified from the 
data exchanges that take place during the authentication session.  This includes 
how the PoP of a secret is carried out and verified, as well as how authentication 
threats, if any, are addressed. 
The key functions, mechanisms and critical components of the 
authentication protocol are broken down into the classification criteria as 
described below.   
 Authentication Factor defines the key component, which is the 
secret in an authentication session. 
 Secret Protection defines how the secret is to be protected 
throughout the authentication session. 
 Authentication Methods defines the various authentication 
mechanisms employed. 
 Support Elements recognizes any additional data elements that are 
transacted in an authentication session, and what characteristics 
they contribute. 
The proposed taxonomy is composed of all the classification criteria set 
herein. 
C. THE PROPOSED TAXONOMY 
The proposed taxonomy for e-authentication protocols is based on 
authentication factor, secret protection, authentication methods, and support 
elements.  To use an analogy, the e-authentication protocol is the language to be 
used for authentication.  The authentication transactions may be seen as 
sentences that are required to convey discussion elements between 
authenticating parties.  The sentence structure is dictated by the authentication 
methods that provide the semantics.  The authentication factor, which refers to 
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the secret to be proven and verified, can be seen as the subject of the sentence.  
The secret protection represents the communication medium to protect the 
communication of the secret.  Finally, the key data elements under the support 
elements category represent the adverbs and adjectives that are transacted in 
support of the secret. 
 
Figure 30.   Overview of proposed taxonomy composition 
1. Authentication Factor 
The "Authentication Factor" classification criteria define the key secret 
component in an authentication process. The secret may exist as one or more of 
the authentication factors commonly categorized as what you know (a 
memorized secret), what you have (token based), and what you are (biometric 
based).  The classification focuses on the knowledge and token based factors 
given this study's focus on e-authentication (online) protocols. Biometric based 
authentication factors are hence out of scope of the taxonomy. 
To avoid possible confusion, we should distinguish the "what you know" 
form of PoP authentication from another form of authentication referred to as 
memory based authentication. With knowledge based authentication, the 
"knowledge" factor refers to some personal identification information; such as 
driver license number, or some other piece of personal information that is not 
generally known to anyone but you and a "trusted" third party (e.g., the DMV in 
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the case of your driver license number). Knowledge based authentication, 
however, is not based on true secrets, and is thus not considered further in this 
study. 
Token based authentication factors entail some form of a physical 
"container" (e.g., smart card) that either contains secret values (e.g., key), 
symmetric or asymmetric, or houses a secretly-seeded algorithm that can 
generate a one-time secret. Asymmetric secrets refer to public and private key 
pairs.  Non-repudiation protection is implicit with the implementation of 
asymmetric secret based authentication, given the "singularity" property required 
of all public-key cryptographic implementations.  This property states that only 
the owner of a particular private key should ever have access to that key.  The 
digital signing of a challenge resulting from the use of a private key thus allows 
for verification of the source of the signed challenge.  Symmetric secrets can be 
static (e.g., a password) or dynamic (e.g., a one-time password). 
 
Figure 31.   Classification based on Authentication Factor 
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2. Secret Protection 
The classification of "Secret Protection" shows the various ways in which 
PoP of the secret can be conveyed in an authentication session.  The secret can 
be transmitted in the clear (no protection), protected via symmetric or asymmetric 
cryptographic means, protected via hashing, or tunneled inside a secure 
communication channel (VPN) when one has been established. 
 
Figure 32.   Classification based on Secret Protection 
3. Authentication Methods 
The "Authentication Methods" classification criteria define the various 
ways in which authentication is carried out to convey the PoP of a secret.  The 
methods in which the authentication can take place may involve a direct 
presentation of the secret, or a series of message exchanges in terms of a 
challenge-response mechanism that precludes direct observation of the secret to 
an online observer.  It may also be a zero-knowledge proof leveraging on 
mathematical algorithms and certain other properties decided on prior to 
deployment that not only precludes direct online observation of the secret, but 
also precludes a database attack on any of the relying party systems (i.e., no 







Figure 33.   Classification based on Authentication Methods 
4. Support Elements 
The "Support Elements" classification recognizes the additional services 
that are provided by the authentication protocols in supporting data integrity and 
maintaining the state of the authenticated session.  These support elements 
sometimes play critical roles in the authentication session regarding what 
security services are provided. 
The existence and implementation of some support elements are crucial in 
addressing the authentication threats.  Random numbers are a key element in 
providing data integrity, and also typical inputs to generating shared secret keys 
(i.e., session keys used to encrypt data exchanges after authentication has 
occurred).  Nonces and timestamps are key elements used in the techniques that 
e-authentication protocols employ in attempting to address and protect against 
impersonation attacks that rely on the ability to replay certain critical 
authentication messages to the authenticator.   
Maintaining session "identity" of an authentication session facilitates 
tracking the state of the session, resulting in a stateful protocol.  A stateful 
protocol may be able to facilitate efficient session resumption in cases of timeout 
for an inactive session. As a result, the re-authentication process may be 
completed in fewer message exchanges as compared to having to complete a 
new authentication process from scratch.  In contrast, a stateless protocol does 
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not maintain any information from the authenticated session, and thus any 
session resumption will need to be done with the complete message exchanges 
for the authentication process. 
 
Figure 34.   Classification based on Support Elements 
D. TAXONOMY ANALYSIS 
In developing the taxonomy, it is possible to provide different perspectives 
of the characteristics of an e-authentication protocol.  The taxonomy facilitates 
analysis of different aspects of the protocols, such as examining the strengths 
and weaknesses of the protocols given the mechanisms, key elements, and the 
secret used in the authentication process.  This enables useful comparison and 
critical analysis of the capabilities that the protocol serves to provide. 
As illustrated in Figure 35, the mechanisms in which the secret is 
exchanged during the authentication process can be organized and analyzed in 
another tree view to illustrate the protocol strengths and weaknesses.  Protocols 
that are classified as employing the use of OTP are more secure and are 
protected against replay and brute force attacks.  A static symmetric secret that 
is used in conjunction with a challenge-response mechanism adds dynamism to 
the authentication factor and is therefore not vulnerable to replay, though it may 
still be attacked by brute force.  The use of a static symmetric secret via direct 
presentation is the weakest of all, as it is trivially subjected to replay and requires 
no brute force effort at all. 
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Figure 35.   Another Tree View – Strengths and Weaknesses 
E. TAXONOMY APPLICABILITY 
The proposed taxonomy for authentication protocols provides key 
components and elements to enable description of the protocol functionality, 
mechanisms, strengths, and weaknesses.  This facilitates greater understanding 
of the authentication protocols in the selection of the appropriate protocols to 
address particular system requirements, operating environments, targeted 
threats, and risks.  The evaluation of the protocols will be more apparent and 
more easily facilitated using the proposed taxonomy. 
Based on the proposed taxonomy for authentication protocols, it is 
important to consider how the taxonomy can be validated, and how different 
perspectives can be created to facilitate selection of potential authentication 
protocols for the problem domain application.  The following table shows one 
dimension of how the taxonomy can be leveraged to create a tabular view in 
categorizing the authentication protocols.  This limited proof of concept illustrates 
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that each classification criterion is represented as a taxonomy tuple.  In 
aggregating all the taxonomy tuples, it is possible to describe the basic 
authentication factor used, authentication mechanism, threats that are 
addressed, and whether the protocol is cryptographically protected. 
 
Table 1.   Taxonomy Tuples Table 
With the proposed taxonomy tree and table created, it might be interesting 
to see how this can be applied to solve real-world authentication problems.  For 
example, a particular authentication requirement may require specific 
authentication factors and mitigation of specified threats.  The taxonomy table 
can be applied to identify possible protocol candidates.  
However, this limited taxonomy was focused on examining the 
authentication transactions between two parties.  It may lack differentiating 
factors between the authentication protocols in terms of the setup required and 
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operating environment within which the protocol is to be deployed.  In seeking a 
potential candidate protocol for use in a real world scenario, the authentication 
function setup, trusted third party, protocol overheads, key management 
infrastructure, and network infrastructure should also be considered. 
1. Authentication Function Setup 
The authentication function setup describes how the authentication is to 
work in the intended operating environment.  The authentication function setup 
may exist in a centralized or distributed fashion.  In a centralized setup, all 
Claimants will go through a single Verifier for authentication.  This is similar to a 
typical client-server setup where the multiple clients will connect and authenticate 
to the single server. 
 
Figure 36.   Centralized Authentication Function Setup 
In a distributed setup, multiple Verifiers may exist, to which the Claimant 
can authenticate depending on the location, domain, proximity, or service 
functionality required.  This means that the multiple Verifiers will have to maintain 
any requisite authentication information.  Some authentication protocols support 
the structure of having only a primary Verifier responsible for maintaining the 
Claimant’s authentication information.  If the Claimant needs to utilize another 
Verifier for authentication, that (non-primary) Verifier may not have the 
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authentication information (secrets) necessary to ascertain the Claimant’s 
identity.  An assertion mechanism may facilitate communication between the two 
Verifiers in order to remedy this situation.  Another mechanism is for the Claimant 
to deliver the assertion from the primary Verifier to the other Verifier for 
authentication. 
 
Figure 37.   Distributed Authentication Function Setup (Multiple Verifiers) 
2. Trusted Third Party 
A trusted third party is an entity which is trusted by all parties participating 
in a given authentication protocol.  Although trusted third parties may be an 
integral component and designed into some authentication protocols, this is not 
modeled in the proposed taxonomy, but rather assumed depending on the type 
of authentication involved (e.g., a Certification Authority in support of asymmetric-
key authentication and a Key Distribution Center in support of Kerberos 
authentication).  The reason for omitting this modeling is that any authentication 
transaction between a Relying Party and a Verifier is simply another instance of a 
Claimant-to-Relying Party authentication transaction.   
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However, this raises another issue; whether or not the authentication 
exchange is trust based or non-trust based.  In a trust-based environment, the 
authenticating parties are within a circle of trust.  As such, the respective 
authenticating parties make authentication decisions independently.  In a non-
trust based environment, usually a third party is required to act as the trusted 
authentication authority, or Verifier, to validate the Claimant’s identity on request 
by a Relying Party. 
3. Protocol Overheads 
The protocols’ overheads are another issue worthy of consideration.  
Protocol overhead refers to the size of the message transactions during an 
authentication session, the number of authentication messages required, the 
amount of processing required, and the amount of memory required.  These will 
have a significant impact on the intended operating environment.  If the 
handshaking process is long and involves several authentication message 
exchanges, this will not be ideal for a limited bandwidth network environment or 
for time critical systems. 
Protocols that have a shorter handshaking process and support session 
resumption will be beneficial to deployment in a mobile environment or where the 
communication link’s persistency may be intermittent.  Authentication session 
resumption will enable the re-authentication process to be completed in fewer 
message exchanges as compared to the complete authentication process. 
4. Support for Key Management Infrastructure 
Secret management infrastructure refers to the processes and resources 
required for the management, control, and distribution of secrets.  This includes 
the generation of secret keys, distribution of keys, renewal of keys upon expiry, 
as well as revocation of compromised keys.  In some instances, the 
authentication protocol provides support for secret re-issuance, renewal, and  
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revocation.  Attributes, such as a validity timestamp of the secret key, are verified 
to check for expired keys.  The renewal or revocation processes may be initiated 
as part of the authentication protocol. 
5. Network Infrastructure 
Authentication protocols are designed to work in specific network 
conditions and environments.  Minimum bandwidth requirements will need to be 
adhered to in order for the authentication protocols to work effectively.  There are 
instances when a persistent TCP connection is required for the duration of not 
only the authentication protocol, but also the remainder of the transaction where 
the claimant is granted access to the requested resource.  While certain 
authentication protocols may support intermittent joining and leaving the session 
without the need to authenticate repeatedly, others require re-authentication 
once the persistent connection is broken.   
It is critical to understand the prerequisites of network infrastructure 
requirements in order for the authentication protocol to work within the targeted 
environment.  For persistent and closed network environments, there will be no 
requirement for the authentication protocol to support intermittent joining and 
leaving the authenticated session.  Single factor authentication using a 
symmetric secret may be sufficient for a closed environment where only 
legitimate and cleared users can physically access the network.  For mobile and 
open network environments, support for mobile users joining and leaving the 
network is required.  The authentication protocol will need to be able to support 
effective re-authentication or enable tolerance for a valid authenticated session.  
Other considerations include deploying multifactor authentication for more secure 
authentication means in light of the higher risk of loss and exposure of secrets in 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND KEY OBSERVATIONS 
In the process of conducting the study on the various e-authentication 
protocols and developing the protocol taxonomy, the primary focus was in 
examining the mechanisms and key elements facilitating the authentication 
process.  There may be differences in how each protocol is implemented; 
however, after peeling the outer layers and inspecting the underlying mechanism, 
it was determined that the fundamental mechanisms governing the way in which 
secrets are exchanged in an authentication session were common in all 
protocols.  Proof of possession of a secret is conducted via asymmetric or 
symmetric means.  Shared symmetric secret is the more commonly used means 
due to its efficiency, relative simplicity, and lower cost of implementation. 
However, asymmetric secrets are necessary when non-repudiation is a required 
security service, and to support large-scale enterprises that are not conducive to 
dynamically establishing symmetric keys. 
The basis of building the taxonomy is dependent on the application of the 
taxonomy.  The approach used in this study’s taxonomy development was to 
perform functional decomposition of the protocol in terms of the functionality it 
provides, the mechanisms it utilizes, and the key elements for facilitating the 
operation of protocol function.  This enabled a breaking-down into the 
fundamental building blocks of what constitutes the fundamental authentication 
part of the protocol.  The development of the taxonomy in this way enabled 
different perspectives and analyses of the protocols’ capabilities and their 
applicability. 
There are also observations of the protocol development trend where the 
later protocol versions tend to be able to support different modes of operation, 
providing value-added functionality beyond what a typical e-authentication  
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protocol does.  There are other protocols that are based on some meta protocol 
framework.  These pose critical taxonomy design considerations on how these 
factors should be treated and classified. 
1. Protocol Development 
The protocol development trend was observed to evolve towards more 
flexibility and the ability to support more options with the later version releases or 
newly developed protocols.  The implementation caters to enabling multiple 
modes of operations, ability to support multiple cryptographic options, etc.  Such 
protocols strive to provide an all-encompassing solution for catering to the 
various authentication needs. 
Taking SSL/TLS as an example, the protocol is able to support multiple 
cryptographic options.  It is within the initial handshaking protocol of the 
authentication process where negotiation is done on the choice of cryptographic 
options to use.  It supports the use of either symmetric and asymmetric secrets 
for authentication.  It also supports both one-way and mutual authentication 
setup, subject to the authentication requirements of the required system. 
Another example, Kerberos V5, provides significant extensions in terms of 
functionality beyond those provided in V4.  The motivation is no doubt to provide 
greater flexibility in the operating environments in which Kerberos can be 
deployed.  The newer version allows the support of different encryption 
algorithms, whereas the previous version assumes DES as the encryption 
algorithm.  Other extensions to the functionality include managing longer ticket 
lifetimes and enabling different realms to have different master secret keys. 
This characteristic of enabling multiple modes and options for operation 
poses a challenge in developing the taxonomy.  Any attempt to put such a 
protocol within a classification scheme has the tendency of falling into multiple 
categories.  This leads to the thinking that the taxonomy classification does not 
seem normalized, and multiple paths of traversal in classification are possible for 
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a single protocol.  This dilemma may be resolved by compliments of the 
taxonomy tuples table, which is able to support such protocol characteristics and 
provides multiple permutations of the possible protocol classifications. 
2. Segregation of Authentication Protocol and Key Exchange 
Protocol 
In the process of taxonomy development, it is imperative to be able to 
differentiate between a key exchange protocol and an authentication protocol, 
which are often mistaken for one another.  This is due to the many currently 
available authentication protocols that provide both the key exchange and 
authentication functions within one protocol implementation.  Being highly related 
and dependent on each other in an authentication process, there are merits in 
such implementation whereby the required message exchanges during an 
authentication process attempt to perform key exchange as well as 
authentication at the same time.  However, in building the taxonomy for e-
authentication protocol, it is imperative that focus be given to the authentication 
function and mechanism, rather than the key exchange protocol. 
Meta protocols such as IPSec facilitate compliant protocols under their 
framework to be modular in fulfilling the specific objectives of performing initial 
endpoint authentication, session key generation/exchange, and subsequent data 
authentication and encryption.  This allows the clear segregation of protocol 
functionality.  Protocol replacement is then made easy in supporting upgrades to 
either of the component protocols, without affecting the overall behavior of the 
meta protocol.   
3. Symmetric Key Distribution 
Proof of possession of a symmetric shared secret is the most commonly 
used authentication means.  The symmetric shared secret is either configured or 
derived within the authentication handshaking process.  This is typically done via 
an agreed algorithm or mathematical properties.  The question is whether is it 
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possible to derive a shared secret between authenticating parties without having 
pre-shared secrets distributed beforehand to serve as building blocks to generate 
the shared secret for authentication purposes and not for generation of a session 
key.  From the study, it does not seem possible at this time, and none of the 
available protocols are able to accomplish that. 
It is a well-accepted fact that symmetric shared secret based 
authentication is less costly to implement as compared to asymmetric means, 
owing to the fact that no complex key management infrastructure is required.  
However, the distribution of the symmetric keys remains the difficult issue to be 
addressed, and presents an ideal use case for asymmetric mechanisms (i.e., 
PKI) that effectively solve this distribution problem and that also provide the 
security objective of non-repudiation. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
The proposed taxonomy is limited in its focus on authentication 
mechanisms only.  There are other worthy considerations to extend the 
taxonomy to enhance differentiation between the authentication protocols for 
effective selection of a potential candidate protocol for the desired problem 
domain.  This will require study beyond the authentication mechanism and 
relates to understanding the characteristics of the operating environment.  
Certain authentication mechanisms may prove to be more effective depending on 
the characteristics of the operating environment.   
The study of protocol overheads is one key area in differentiating the 
authentication protocols in terms of their efficiency to complete the handshaking 
and authentication process within a certain number of messages, and in 
considering whether the required message size is reasonable for the constrained 
bandwidth of the operating environment.  Quick authentication modes with a 
session resumption process would be beneficial for environments where the 
communication link is intermittent and unstable, or the Claimant is highly mobile. 
 67
The other notable issue is with regard to the authentication function setup 
supported.  It would be appropriate for a highly mobile environment to require the 
authentication function setup to be distributed rather than centralized.  A 
particular authentication protocol may satisfy the system requirement in terms of 
functionality but does not support distributed authentication setup.  In another 
scenario, an authentication protocol may need to employ the services of a trusted 
third party and will have specific operating network environment requirements.  
The authentication protocol will not be effective if requirements are not as 
expected in the actual deployment environment. 
Lastly, the support for a secret management infrastructure may be 
provided by some authentication protocol to incorporate the revocation process 
after assessing the token’s validity.  It may be a redundant feature if is not 
available for implementation in the actual operating environment. 
In general, understanding the characteristics of the operating environment 
will place more demands on studying the authentication protocols from different 
perspectives and goes beyond the functionality and mechanism within the 
authentication process.  This will indeed pose significant challenges to the 
extension and design of the taxonomy.  However, a successful attempt in putting 
these considerations together to enrich the taxonomy will result in a more 
comprehensive and applicable taxonomy for addressing real deployment in the 
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